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Corruption along ethnic lines:  
A study of individual corruption experiences in 17 African countries 
 
Ann-Sofie Isaksson∗
 
 
Abstract: While a growing literature relates macro variation in corruption to ethnic divisions, 
existing studies have paid little attention to the possible existence of systematic micro variation in 
corruption along ethnic lines. The present paper examines whether individual corruption 
experiences vary systematically depending on ethnic group affiliation, and what the nature of this 
possible variation is. More specifically, it considers the effect of belonging to influential ethnic 
groups. Empirical findings drawing on data for more than 23,000 respondents in 17 African 
countries indeed suggest that individual corruption experiences vary systematically along ethnic 
lines. Belonging to influential ethnic groups – in terms of relative group size or relative economic 
and political standing – is associated with a greater probability of having experienced corruption. 
Assuming that belonging to a larger and economically/politically stronger group helps proxy for a 
greater probability of the corrupt public official being a co-ethnic, this should imply more 
corruption among co-ethnics, supporting the idea that enforcement mechanisms within ethnic 
groups could act to strengthen corrupt contracts. The results depend on the type of corruption 
considered, though; when focusing on a more clearly extortive form of corruption, there is less 
evidence of collusive behaviour. 
 
JEL classification: D73, O12, O55 
Keywords: Corruption, Ethnic groups, Africa, Afrobarometer. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is not only the poorest region in the world; it is also home to some of the 
world’s most corrupt and ethnically fragmented countries. Perhaps as a consequence, a 
growing literature relates corruption and poor quality of government more generally to ethnic 
divisions (see e.g. Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; LaPorta et al., 1999; Treisman, 
2000; Alesina et al., 2003). However, while existing studies have investigated macro – and to 
a lesser extent, meso – variation in ethnic divisions and corruption outcomes, there is a lack of 
work focusing on the possible existence of systematic individual variation in corruption 
experiences based in ethnic affiliations.  
                                                          
 ∗ University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics; The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. 
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The present paper explores variation in individual corruption experiences along ethnic 
lines. Drawing on recent data on over 23,000 respondents in 17 African countries, the aim is 
to examine whether individual corruption experiences vary systematically depending on 
ethnic group affiliation, and if they do, what is the nature of this variation. More specifically, 
it considers the effect of belonging to influential ethnic groups – in terms of relative group 
size or relative economic and political standing – arguing that this should help proxy for a 
greater probability that the encountered public official is a co-ethnic. The empirical findings 
indeed suggest that individual corruption experiences vary systematically along ethnic lines. 
Belonging to influential ethnic groups is associated with a greater probability of having 
experienced corruption, seemingly suggesting more corruption among co-ethnics and 
supporting the idea that enforcement mechanisms within ethnic groups could act to strengthen 
corrupt contracts. However, the results depend on the type of corruption considered; focusing 
on a more clearly extortive form of corruption, there is less evidence of collusive behaviour.  
Several studies suggest that corruption is more prevalent in more ethnically fragmented 
countries (Mauro, 1995; LaPorta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003). While 
one cannot draw causal conclusions based on this cross-country correlation pattern – ethnic 
fractionalization is likely to pick up omitted factors related to corruption (e.g. level of 
economic development, see La Porta el al., 1999, and Treisman, 2000) – it is interesting to 
note that there is within-country evidence also pointing to more corruption in ethnically 
fragmented locations. In a study on corruption in an Indonesian anti-poverty programme 
distributing subsidized rice, Olken (2006) finds that areas with higher within-village ethnic 
fragmentation have a higher likelihood of experiencing corruption. Similarly, considering 
variation within the U.S., Glaeser and Saks (2006) find higher levels of corruption in more 
racially fragmented states, controlling for state differences in income, education, population 
size and degree of urbanization. 
Furthermore, some recent studies stress the role of ethnic inequalities and ethnic 
segregation. Alesina et al. (2012) find that countries with higher levels of ethnic inequality, 
i.e. economic inequalities across ethnic groups within countries (see also Baldwin and Huber, 
2010), tend to have higher levels of corruption. Similarly, Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) 
find that more ethnically segregated countries, i.e. those where groups live more 
geographically separated, tend to score worse on a number of quality of government 
indicators, including corruption control.  
Observing macro and meso level relationships between corruption and these ethnic 
dimensions naturally raises the question of whether more ethnically 
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fragmented/segregated/unequal locations experience higher levels of corruption across the 
board, or if there is systematic variation in corruption experiences depending on individual 
ethnic affiliations. I am not aware of any studies exploring the possible links between ethnic 
affiliations and corruption experiences at the micro level. Hence, the main contribution of the 
present paper lies in investigating whether individual corruption experiences also vary 
systematically along ethnic lines and, if so, through what mechanisms.  
 
2 Corruption along ethnic lines: theoretical background 
 
Thinking of corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1975; 
Bardhan, 1997), one can assume that the public official weighs the benefits of corrupt 
behaviour against its costs and then chooses to establish a corrupt relationship when the 
former outweigh the latter (see the reasoning in Glaeser and Saks, 2006). While the benefits 
of corruption have to do with the public official’s ability to extract resources for personal 
gain, which is in turn related to the size of the bureaucracy and the level of discretion s/he has 
over the provision of government goods, its costs originate in the probability of, and the 
penalties from, being caught (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
In line with this, it has been suggested that ethnic divisions impact corruption by reducing 
the popular will to oppose corrupt politicians (see e.g. Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Banerjee and 
Pande, 2007). The argument is that redistribution across ethnic groups (see e.g. Burgess et al., 
2009, and Franck and Rainer, 2011) makes people support candidates from their own ethnic 
group, even if s/he is known to be corrupt, and by doing so decrease the cost of corruption. 
Presumably, acceptance of high level corruption – i.e. corruption among elected leaders – 
could then translate into a greater acceptance of corruption among lower level public officials 
too. Through these mechanisms related to ethnic divisions, society risks being infested by 
corruption. However, the suggested increase in corruption might well affect the ethnically 
divided society across the board; individual corruption experiences need not vary depending 
on specific ethnic affiliations.  
A slightly different (but not mutually exclusive) approach is to argue that the likelihood 
that a corrupt relationship is established depends on the ethnic affiliations of the individuals 
involved. While this view suggests that individual corruption exposure should vary 
systematically along ethnic lines, the predicted nature of this variation is not all clear. 
Habyarimana et al. (2007) suggest that ethnically homogeneous communities have an 
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advantage in providing public goods because ethnic groups possess both cooperation-
facilitating norms and networks that facilitate the sanctioning of community members who 
fail to contribute to collective endeavours.1
In the context of corruption along ethnic lines, the relevant question becomes what 
constitutes the collective endeavour among co-ethnics – upholding corrupt relationships or 
preventing them? The answer to this question should depend on to what extent the corrupt 
transactions are extortive or collusive. Extortive, or non-collusive, corruption refers to 
situations where the government official has the discretionary power to refuse or delay a 
service that the individual is legally entitled to in order to extract a rent. As such, it can be 
seen as a form of blackmailing that is beneficial to the bribe-taker but imposes additional 
costs on the bribe-giver. Collusive corruption, on the other hand, is mutually beneficial to 
both the bribe-taker and the bribe-giver, meaning that upholding the corrupt relationship lies 
in the interest of both parties involved (see e.g. Brunetti and Weder, 2003; and Foellmi and 
Oechslin, 2007). Whereas collusive corruption often refers to situations where the individual 
is involved in illegal activity (e.g. bribing a tax auditor to overlook a case of tax evasion), 
extortive corruption suggests no blame on the part of the individual. 
 A shared culture – language, experience etc. – 
may make co-ethnics more effective than non-co-ethnics in communicating and working 
together and in establishing cooperative norms, and a shared membership in a social network 
may enable co-ethnics to find, and punish, non-cooperators. Viewing ethnic groups as 
institutions for collective action, this argument can reasonably be extended to a broad range of 
outcomes that depend on collective efforts (Kimenyi, 2006; Habyarimana et al., 2007).  
Still, the distinction between extortive and collusive corruption is by no means clear-cut 
and reasonably needs to be judged on a scale rather than as two distinct categories. In 
particular, even if the individual is in fact legally entitled to the service in question, the bribe 
could be framed and perceived as mutually beneficial to both the individual and the public 
official. In order to collect a bribe, the public official may use his/her discretionary power to 
deny the individual a service (e.g. a government permit) that s/he is legally entitled to. Yet, 
with widespread corruption and in the presence of pervasive and cumbersome regulations, the 
corrupt transaction may well be framed as necessary ‘speed money’ used as a means to cut 
red tape. In order to collect bribes and reduce the likelihood of being reported, the corrupt 
public official has an incentive to convince the individual that the corrupt transaction is in 
                                                          
1 An alternative explanation to low public goods provision in ethnically diverse societies is that heterogeneous 
preferences across ethnic groups make it difficult to pull resources together for public projects (see e.g. Alesina 
et al., 1999). 
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their common interest (Bardhan, 1997). This should be easier to accomplish in some instances 
than in others. In particular, it is arguably easier for the public official to frame the corrupt 
transaction as collusive if s/he has an informational advantage, e.g. if obtaining the 
government service involves a non-transparent application procedure that is difficult for the 
individual to monitor, and if there are economic stakes involved for the individual. In 
contrast, in a situation where the rights of the individual are more straightforward and 
behaviour is clearly observable (consider e.g. a police road block), it should be more difficult 
to present the bribe as something other than extortive. 
So, whether co-ethnics uphold or prevent corrupt relationships should depend on the type 
of corrupt transaction, and in particular on to what extent it could be perceived – rightly or not 
– to be mutually beneficial to both parties involved. If the corrupt relationship contains an 
element of collusion, the enforcement mechanisms within ethnic communities – the ability to 
provide information about and internal sanctions against those who betray their co-ethnics – 
could arguably act to strengthen the corrupt ‘contract’ (Treisman, 2000). However, if the 
corrupt transaction is more clearly extortive, this enforcement mechanism could reasonably 
work in the opposite direction, i.e. to uphold a non-corrupt relationship. Also, in line with the 
above discussion, within-group social ties could presumably enable anti-bribery agreements 
between co-ethnics, and thus strengthen social norms against corruption within the ethnic 
group. 
The above arguments raise some interesting questions. First of all, do individual 
corruption experiences in fact vary systematically along ethnic lines, and second, what is the 
nature of this possible variation? In particular, do co-ethnics uphold or prevent corrupt 
relationships, and does this depend on the type of corrupt transaction? With access to 
information on individual corruption experiences and ethnic group affiliations, it is possible to 
address the first question. With respect to the second question, the fact that the dataset has 
information about the ethnic group affiliation of the individual paying the bribe but not of the 
bribe-taker requires us to make some assumptions. In particular, it seems reasonable to argue 
that belonging to an influential group – measured in terms of relative group size or the 
group’s relative economic standing or political influence – should involve a greater 
probability that the encountered public official, i.e. the bribe-taker, is a co-ethnic. This will be 
discussed further in the following section. 
 
3 Data and empirical strategy 
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Being interested in to what extent individual experiences with corruption depend on ethnic 
affiliations, I use data from the fourth wave of the Afrobarometer, conducted in 2008-2009. 
The Afrobarometer is a comprehensive multi-country survey project collecting data on 
political and economic attitudes and behaviour of African citizens. As such, it is uniquely 
suited to study corruption experiences in a large African multi-country sample. The sample 
consists of roughly 23,900 respondents from 17 African countries – Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 2  The survey covers a 
representative sample of each country’s adult population3
iCorruption
  and asks a standard set of questions 
in all countries, thus allowing for cross-national comparisons. The following benchmark 
probit for the corruption experience  of individual I is estimated: 
 
[ ] ( )ciiii EthnicCorruptionprob γδRβX +++⋅Φ== λ1 . 
 
That is, the probability that individual i has experienced corruption in the last year is taken to 
depend on affiliation with an influential ethnic group iEthnic , individual controls iX , and 
regional controls iR , allowing for country fixed effects cγ . ( )⋅Φ  denotes the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function.  
 
3.1 Dependent variable 
 
In Section 2, corruption was defined as ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’. The 
dependent variable is meant to capture individual experiences with corruption in dealing with 
public officials. That is, the focus is on individuals’ direct experiences with petty corruption 
as opposed to their perceptions of grand corruption higher up in government. The first 
dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if, in the past year, the 
respondent has ‘had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order 
to get a document or permit’. Those with no experience of the activity during the period – 23 
                                                          
2 Cape Verde, Lesotho and Madagascar are excluded since they display essentially no variation in terms of 
ethnic group affiliations (in Cape Verde 99.8 per cent of the respondents belong to the same language group, and 
in Lesotho and Madagascar the equivalent figures are 97.8 and 99.9 per cent).  
3 For more information about the Afrobarometer sampling procedures and survey methods, see Bratton et al., 
(2005) and the Afrobarometer Network (2007). 
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percent of the full sample – are left out of the estimation (variation in the tendency to apply 
for documents and permits is investigated in Section 4.2). When a government official 
collects bribes for providing ‘documents and permits’, they charge personally for goods that 
the state officially owns, thereby ‘misusing public office for private gain’, in line with the 
above definition of corruption. 4
Given how the survey question is phrased (asking whether the respondent ‘had to pay a 
bribe’) and what information respondents can be expected to willingly disclose, this indicator 
should pick up situations where services that citizens are legally entitled to are conditioned 
upon paying a bribe (see the discussion in Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2011). However, as 
discussed in Section 2, in order to collect bribes and reduce the likelihood of being reported, 
the corrupt public official has an incentive to convince the individual that the corrupt 
transaction is in their common interest. Hence, even if the individual is legally entitled to the 
service in question, the bribe paid to the public official could be framed and perceived as 
beneficial to both parties, e.g. as necessary ‘speed money’ to cut red tape. An application 
procedure for a government permit is arguably relatively non-transparent and difficult for the 
individual to monitor, enabling the public official to frame the corrupt transaction as mutually 
beneficial. Moreover, documents and permits are not demanded for their own sake, but rather 
to comply with regulations that restrict economic activity, meaning that there are most likely 
economic stakes involved for the individual. Having one’s permit request put at the top rather 
than the bottom of a pile of applications could have significant consequences for one’s 
earning opportunities. Against this background, it seems reasonable that the corrupt 
transactions captured in the documents/permits measure could contain an element of 
collusion.  
 In the overall sample, of those who applied for a document or 
permit during the last year, roughly 20 per cent had experienced corruption (Table A1). There 
is substantial country variation though, with the share ranging from around 1 per cent in 
Botswana to around 33 per cent in Kenya (country heterogeneity in results is explored in 
Section 4.2).  
To investigate whether this affects to what extent co-ethnics uphold or prevent corrupt 
relationships, the results using the documents/permits measure will be compared with the 
findings one gets when using an indicator capturing corruption that is more clearly extortive. 
                                                          
4 The perception of what constitutes a bribe is likely to vary across cultures. In some developing countries, gift-
exchange is for example customary in business transactions (Bardhan, 1997). However, the survey question asks 
about situations where the individual was required to offer the public official something in order to get the 
service, i.e. before it was provided rather than as a courtesy afterwards. Moreover, the estimations include 
controls for country variation in the average level of corruption (e.g. originating in different norms of what 
constitutes bribery) and focus on within-country variation in the same. 
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Specifically, a dummy variable taking the value one if, in the past year, the respondent has 
‘had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to get water or 
sanitation services’ is used (again, leaving those with no experience of the activity during the 
period out of the estimation). Unlike applications for documents and permits, which could be 
difficult for the individual to monitor and which could have important consequences for 
his/her earnings opportunities, this indicator concerns access to a basic service. Arguably, 
conditioning basic water or sanitation services upon paying a bribe is more clearly a case of 
non-collusive, or extortive, corruption. If anything, we should thus expect less corruption 
among co-ethnics when using this indicator. 
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
 
The main explanatory variables focus on ethnic group affiliations. Although measures of 
different ethnic groupings are commonly used in the economics literature,5
To proxy for ethnic group affiliations, the following question is used: ‘Which 
[Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] language is your home language? That is, the language of your group 
of origin.’ While ethnicity and language are not synonymous – several ethnic groups could 
share a lingua franca or subgroups of the same ethnicity may speak distinct dialects – it is 
commonly used to capture ethnic affiliations. Presenting the findings of the first round of the 
Afrobarometer, Bratton et al. (2005, p. 428) argue that ‘language remains the best single 
marker of cultural identity and is used by Africans themselves as a quick and reliable way to 
 it is important to 
note that ethnicity is a complex concept that does not lend itself to easy measurement (see e.g. 
Horowitz, 1985). In the words of Erdmann (2007, p. 11) it ‘denotes a historically and socially 
constructed identity […] that is multifaceted, changeable and has multiple meanings’, or as 
Fearon (2003) puts it – it is a ‘slippery concept’. In line with this description, ethnic groups 
are thought of as socially constructed identities (rather than biologically given entities) 
originating in a shared culture. While there is not necessarily one right way to specify the set 
of ethnic groups in a country, implicit in the notion of an ethnic group is the idea that 
members and non-members recognize the distinction between groups, meaning that a 
reasonable list of ethnic groups in a country should depend on what people in the country 
themselves identify as relevant ethnic groupings (Fearon, 2003).  
                                                          
5 See e.g. Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) on ethnic fractionalization, Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) on ethnic polarization and, as mentioned above, Alesina et al. (2012) on ethnic inequalities and 
Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) on ethnic segregation.  
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attribute ethnicity’ (see also the discussion in Posner, 2003, and in Cheeseman and Ford, 
2007).6
The estimations of primary interest rather focus on whether the respondents belong to 
influential groups – in terms of size, economic or political influence – arguing that this should 
help proxy for a greater probability that the encountered public official is a co-ethnic. 
Considering relative group size, compared with someone who is a member of a smaller group, 
the mere fact that the member of a larger group has a greater number of co-ethnics should 
arguably translate into this individual having a greater probability of encountering a public 
official who is a co-ethnic. In terms of group size, the main variable of interest is a dummy 
indicating whether the respondent belongs to the country’s largest ethnic group, i.e. the largest 
language group in the country sample. To investigate whether belonging to the largest ethnic 
group has a threshold effect on corruption or if corruption experiences vary linearly with 
group size, the group’s population share in the country (i.e. the share of the survey 
respondents in the country speaking the concerned language) is also considered.  
 The rich data material allows for construction of roughly 330 ethnic group dummies. 
However, these will merely be used to get a rough picture of whether there is in fact 
systematic variation in corruption experiences depending on ethnic group affiliations (i.e. 
their individual estimates will not be interpreted).  
However, the recruitment of public officials may not be neutral. Rather, there is evidence 
suggesting that nepotism and a tendency of rulers to recruit bureaucrats primarily from their 
own ethnic group is a common problem in many African countries (Kimenyi, 2006). 
Moreover, the largest group in the country does not necessarily need to be the group that is 
closest to the ruling elite. Therefore, being affiliated to an ethnic group that is relatively 
privileged is used as an additional proxy for a greater probability of the bribe-taker being a 
co-ethnic. Two variables intended to capture the relative economic and political standing of 
the respondents’ respective ethnic groups are used: a dummy variable taking the value one if 
the respondent considers that s/he belongs to an ethnic group with better economic conditions 
than other ethnic groups in the country, and an equivalent dummy indicating whether the 
                                                          
6 The alternative would be to use the question ‘What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.’ 
However, this question is problematic since some respondents answer in ‘non-ethnic’ terms (e.g. with respect to 
age, gender and political affiliations), and because a relatively large number of respondents (over 2,000) either 
do not answer the question or claim to identify in national rather than ethnic terms. The latter is of course  
interesting in itself, why a variable focusing on the salience of ethnic identities later will be included, but for the 
ethnic group affiliations variable it is relevant to consider not only how the respondents perceive themselves, but 
also how they are perceived by others with whom they might engage in potentially corrupt transactions. Even if 
you yourself do not identify in ethnic terms, others may see you as a member of their group, and treat you 
accordingly. 
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respondent considers that s/he belongs to an ethnic group with more political influence than 
other groups in the country. 
We should control for other factors – not depending on individual ethnic affiliations – 
possibly affecting the costs and benefits of corruption to the public official, as well for factors 
affecting to what extent the respondent is exposed to situations where corrupt transactions 
might take place. Just as the individual being a co-ethnic or a non-co-ethnic could potentially 
affect the public official’s judgment of the costs and benefits of a corrupt transaction (e.g. 
originating in the perceived likelihood of being reported or in the individual’s perceived 
ability to pay), so could presumably other socio-demographic characteristics of the individual. 
Moreover, the individual’s socio-demographic characteristics presumably also affect to what 
extent s/he is exposed to situations where corrupt transactions might take place – with respect 
to the corruption measure in focus, meaning the extent to which s/he applies for ‘documents 
and permits’. Hence, controls for the age, gender, urban/rural residence, level of education, 
religious affiliation, employment status and economic standing of respondents are included.7 
Considering that the average level of corruption is likely to vary across regions depending on 
the composition of the population residing there, controls for sub-national regional8
 
 averages 
in terms of education, employment, economic standing, rurality (the share of respondents 
living in rural areas) and religion are also included. Finally, country dummies are included to 
control for country variation in average corruption levels. For variable descriptions and 
summary statistics, see Tables A1-A2. 
4 Results 
 
This section examines empirically whether individual corruption experiences vary 
systematically depending on ethnic group affiliations, and the nature of this possible variation. 
After considering the results of the benchmark estimations, alternative specifications are 
evaluated.   
 
  
                                                          
7  Since there may be reverse causality going from the individual’s experience with corruption to his/her 
economic standing and employment status, estimations are run both with and without these controls, exploring 
the sensitivity of the ethnic affiliation parameters.  
8  The regions refer to the first-order administrative division in a country, in the survey manual denoted 
‘region/province’ (Afrobarometer Network, 2007). 
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4.1 Main findings 
 
First of all, the empirical findings indeed suggest that individual corruption experiences vary 
systematically along ethnic lines. Running regressions including the around 330 ethnic group 
dummies (and control variables), they are clearly jointly important for determining corruption 
experiences.9
The first corruption measure considers experience with corruption when applying for 
documents and permits. Compared with someone belonging to a smaller group, an individual 
belonging to the largest ethnic group in a country is around 3 percentage points more likely to 
have experienced corruption when applying for documents and permits in the past year (Table 
1). This result remains in the face of both individual and regional controls. Similarly, when 
considering the group share measure (Table 2, Panel A), individuals belonging to larger 
ethnic groups to a greater extent tend to have experienced corruption. Hence, there is 
seemingly not only a threshold effect of belonging to the country’s largest group, but also a 
more general trend suggesting a greater tendency for having experienced corruption in larger 
ethnic groups. Again, this result remains in the face of both individual and regional controls. 
If belonging to a larger ethnic group helps proxy for a greater probability of the encountered 
public official being a co-ethnic, these results thus seem to imply more corruption among co-
ethnics.  
 Performing log likelihood ratio tests where the unrestricted model includes the 
ethnic group dummies and the restricted model does not, the null-hypothesis that excluding 
the ethnic group dummies does not affect the explanatory power of the model can be firmly 
rejected for both corruption outcomes. More interesting for our purposes, however, is that 
belonging to influential ethnic groups – in terms of relative group size or relative economic 
and political standing – is seemingly a relevant determinant of individual experiences with 
corruption. 
As discussed in Section 2, however, the fact that the recruitment of public officials may 
not be neutral and that the largest group in the country need not necessarily be the group that 
is closest to the ruling elite, we should also consider measures focusing on the groups’ relative 
economic and political standing. As it turns out, though, the results of empirical estimations 
using these measures have similar implications. In line with the relative group size estimates, 
they suggest that individuals who belong to an economically better off group or a group 
                                                          
9 Not presented, but available upon request. Many ethnic group dummies predict the outcome variable perfectly, 
meaning that a substantial number of observations have to be dropped from the estimation when these dummies 
are included.  
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judged as having more political influence than other groups in their country (Table 2, Panels 
B-C) are about 2 percentage points more likely to experience corruption. While compared 
with the group size estimates these parameters are somewhat less precisely estimated, they are 
positive in all estimations and tend to become more precisely estimated when including 
regional controls and controls for individual socio-economic standing. Hence, for our first 
corruption measure, intended to capture corrupt transactions containing an element of 
collusion, the empirical results as expected seem to suggest more corruption among co-
ethnics, i.e. that ethnic ties are used to uphold rather than prevent corrupt relationships.  
To investigate whether this result changes when using an indicator capturing corruption 
that is more clearly extortive, let us consider estimations focusing on whether the respondents 
have experience of basic water or sanitation services being conditioned upon paying a bribe 
(see the discussion in Section 3). The results when using this alternative corruption measure 
(Table 3) suggest no systematic variation in corruption experiences depending on the size of 
the respondent’s ethnic group. Belonging to a group judged as economically better off, on the 
other hand, is again positively associated with corruption experiences (for groups judged as 
having more political influence, the positive parameter is not quite statistically significant).10
 
 
Hence, as expected, using an alternative measure intended to capture corruption that is not to 
the same extent collusive, there is less evidence of more corruption among co-ethnics. If 
anything, However, the ‘influential ethnic group’ parameters are still, if anything, positive. 
Importantly then, whereas the extent to which co-ethnics uphold corrupt relationships seems 
to vary with the type of corrupt transaction considered, the empirical findings provide no 
evidence for co-ethnics acting to prevent corrupt transactions. 
4.2 Further testing 
 
Our first corruption measure focuses on experiences with corruption when applying for 
‘documents and permits’. A reasonable worry is that the result that members of larger and 
more economically/politically influential groups experience more corruption is driven by 
members of these groups being more economically active and thus more exposed to situations 
potentially involving corruption. Controls for individual economic standing, employment and 
education, as well as a number of other socio-demographic variables, are intended to capture 
variation in the tendency to apply for documents and permits.  
                                                          
10 While we control for the economic standing of the individual, it is possible that the bribe-taker’s judgement of 
the individual’s capacity to pay is partly based on the individual’s ethnic group affiliation. 
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However, to further explore whether this could be what drives the results, an alternative 
set of estimations (Table A3) focuses on whether the respondents have in fact applied for a 
document or permit during the past year. Reassuringly, using a dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent never applied for a document or permit as dependent variable, none of 
the ethnic group parameters come out anywhere near statistically significant. 11
In terms of group size, so far we have considered the respective ethnic groups’ relative 
size within the country. However, it might be that an effect of belonging to a large group 
operates at a local rather than national level. Hence, in an alternative set of estimations, a 
dummy indicating whether the respondent belongs to the largest ethnic group in his/her region 
of residence is used instead (the results are available upon request). While this too comes out 
positively related to individual corruption experiences as measured by the documents and 
permits indicator, the marginal effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels 
(using the alternative water and sanitation corruption measure there is still no effect of 
belonging to the majority group). However, considering the risk that the survey misrepresents 
the sub-national spatial distribution of ethnic groups – it is not necessarily representative at 
the regional level – and the endogeneity concern that arises due to within-country mobility of 
ethnic group members (see the discussion in Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011), these results 
need to be interpreted with care.   
 Doing the 
same for our alternative corruption measure, i.e. considering a dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent never attempted to get water and sanitation services in the past year, 
the findings are again reassuring in that none of the ethnic group parameters are anywhere 
close to statistically significant (the results are available upon request).   
Presumably, the effects of ethnic ties should be more pronounced if people have strong 
ethnic identities than if they care little about their ethnic backgrounds. However, our main 
ethnic affiliation variable, indicating whether the respondents belong to their country’s largest 
ethnic group, does not reveal whether people in fact identify in ethnic terms. To explore to 
what extent the results are affected by the salience of individual ethnic identities, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent identifies more strongly with their ethnic group 
                                                          
11 Moreover, one can note that for several of the socio-demographic controls, the results in this estimation are the 
mirror image of what can be observed in estimations using corruption experience as dependent variable – that is, 
variables associated with less corruption are associated with a greater probability of never having applied for a 
document or permit (and vice versa). The ethnic group variables, on the other hand, are significantly related to 
corruption but not to whether the individual has ever applied for a document or permit, arguably adding support 
to that we pick up ethnic group variation in corruption rather than in economic activity. 
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than with their country is included12 and interacted with the dummy for belonging to the 
largest ethnic group (the results are available upon request). While the ‘largest ethnic group’ 
and the ‘ethnic identity’ measures each independently come out positively related to having 
experienced corruption when applying for documents and permits, the results do not suggest a 
statistically significant interaction effect between the two,13
For the alternative (water and sanitation) corruption indicator, on the other hand, the 
results suggest a weakly statistically significant negative interaction effect between belonging 
to the country’s largest ethnic group and having a strong ethnic identity. While we cannot 
base any strong conclusions on this finding, it is in line with the idea that for extortive 
corruption, co-ethnics are more likely to prevent corrupt transactions when the respondents 
have a stronger ethnic identity.  
 i.e. there is no evidence that the 
effect of belonging to the largest group varies with the individual’s own strength of ethnic 
identification. With respect to the latter, it is again worth noting that in the context of a 
corrupt transaction between co-ethnics, even if individuals do not identify themselves in 
ethnic terms, others may still see them as members of their groups and thus treat them 
accordingly. And with regard to the independent effect of individual ethnic identity, it is 
possible that people with strong ethnic identities to a greater extent seek out public officials 
who are co-ethnics. 
A next step is to explore heterogeneity at the country level. The 17 sample countries are 
located in Sub-Saharan Africa and have in common that they are relatively young 
democracies that are usually judged as having comparatively high levels of corruption by 
international standards. However, it is important to note that they are by no means 
homogenous, neither with respect to the dependent variable, i.e. the extent to which their 
citizens experience corruption (see Figures A1-A2), nor as regards the existence, nature and 
salience of ethnic divisions (see Figures A3-A6). With only 17 countries we are ill-equipped 
to explore parameter heterogeneity for the main explanatory variables by use of country-level 
interaction terms. What we can do, however, is consider to what extent the results change 
when omitting the more extreme cases. Table A4 presents the results of the baseline 
regression (equivalent to Table 1, estimation 5) run for different sub-samples.  
                                                          
12 Based on the question ’Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and 
being a [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?’, with response 
categories ranging from  ‘1=I feel only (respondent’s ethnic group)’ to ‘5=I feel only [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.]’. 
13 Moreover, alternative estimations suggest no statistically significant effect of the regional share with ethnic 
identities, nor an interaction effect between this measure and belonging to the largest ethnic group in the region 
(as noted, however, this measure is not ideal). 
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First of all, the size and number of ethnic groups could presumably affect the results. The 
size of groups should matter for whether they serve as viable bases for political coalition 
building and is thereby likely to affect the political landscape and the salience attached to 
group divisions (Posner, 2004). If a country has many ethnic groups and none are large 
enough to mobilize around politically, the ethnic group divisions need not become politically 
salient. Moreover, if no group has a clear majority position, this should make the supposed 
link between belonging to the largest ethnic group and the encountered public official being a 
co-ethnic less clear. Yet on the other hand, very large groups might be less cohesive than 
smaller groups; if almost the entire population have the same ethnic background, people may 
be less inclined to attach importance to ethnic divisions. In Tanzania the largest ethnic group 
consists of around 18 percent of the population, In Zimbabwe the equivalent figure is 82 
percent (Figure A3). It thus seems reasonable to explore this source of heterogeneity.  
The baseline regression is first run excluding the five countries whose largest ethnic 
group is comparatively small (Table A4, Sample 1), and then leaving out the five countries 
where the population share of the largest group is comparatively great (Table A4, Sample 2). 
In a similar fashion, the five countries with the highest and lowest number of ethnic groups 
are excluded (Table A4, Samples 3 and 4, respectively). The positive and statistically 
significant relationship between belonging to a country’s largest ethnic group and having 
experienced corruption when applying for documents and permits remains in all concerned 
sub-samples.  
Aggregating the ethnic identity measure used above (indicating whether respondents 
identify more strongly with their ethnic group than with their country), it is possible to 
explore country variation in the salience of ethnic divisions more directly. Running the 
baseline regression first excluding the five countries where the smallest share of respondents 
identify themselves in ethnic terms (Table A4, Sample 5), and second leaving out the five 
countries where the largest share of respondents do so (Table A4, Sample 6), the main results 
again stand in both sub-samples. If anything, and somewhat puzzling, the ‘largest ethnic 
group’ effect is greater and more precisely estimated when excluding the countries with 
supposedly stronger ethnic identifications. However, when comparing across countries it is 
not ideal to use a measure that depends not only on the strength of respondents’ ethnic 
identification but also on their feelings towards their country. Even if citizens in country A 
identify themselves more strongly in ethnic terms than citizens in country B, the measure 
could suggest otherwise simply because citizens in country A identify more strongly with 
their country. 
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An alternative is to use an indicator measuring the trust people have in members of their 
own ethnic group relative to members of other ethnic groups in the country.14 This seems to 
be a good measure of to what extent transactions between co-ethnics should differ from those 
among non-co-ethnics. I define a country’s ‘ethnic trust gap’ as the average trust respondents 
report to have in people from their own group minus the average trust they report to have in 
people from other groups (for a more elaborate definition, see Figure A5), and then run the 
baseline regression first excluding the five countries with the smallest trust gap (Table A4, 
Sample 7) and next leaving out the countries with the largest gap (Table A4, Sample 8). 
While belonging to a country’s largest ethnic group is positively related to experiences with 
corruption when applying for documents and permits in both sub-samples, as might be 
expected the effect is larger and more precisely estimated when excluding the countries with 
smaller ethnic trust gaps.15
With respect to the alternative (water and sanitation) corruption measure (Panel B), in 
sample 3 we can observe a small positive marginal effect of belonging to the country’s largest 
ethnic group. For the remaining seven sub-samples, on the other hand, the results are in line 
with the full sample estimation, i.e. suggesting no statistically significant effect of belonging 
to the largest group. Hence, the restricted sample estimations add to the picture that whether 
co-ethnics uphold corrupt relationships depends on to what extent the corrupt transaction can 
be framed as mutually beneficial to both parties involved. 
  
 
5 Conclusions 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is home to some of the world’s most corrupt and ethnically fragmented 
countries. Whereas a growing literature relates macro variation in corruption to ethnic 
divisions, existing studies have not examined the possible existence of systematic micro 
variation in corruption along ethnic lines. Against this background, the present paper 
investigated whether individual corruption experiences vary systematically depending on 
ethnic group affiliation and, if so, what the nature of this variation is. More specifically, it 
considered the effect of belonging to influential ethnic groups – in terms of relative group size 
                                                          
14 This variable is based on round 3 of the Afrobarometer rather than round 4, as the rest of the empirical 
analysis. This leaves us with a sample of 14 instead of 17 countries (Burkina Faso and Liberia are not included 
in round 3, and the particular set of questions used were not asked in Zimbabwe). 
15 Running estimations for all the different sub-samples in Table A4, but instead of using the ‘largest group’ 
measure focusing on whether the individual belongs to an economically better off or politically more influential 
group (i.e. estimations equivalent to column 5 in Table 3), the results suggest a similar pattern.  
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or relative economic and political standing – arguing that this should help proxy for a greater 
probability that the encountered public official is a co-ethnic.  
Viewing ethnic groups as institutions for collective action, a shared culture may make co-
ethnics more effective than non-co-ethnics in communicating and working together and in 
establishing cooperative norms. Also, shared membership in a social network may enable co-
ethnics to find, and punish, non-cooperators. If co-ethnics have an advantage in terms of 
collective action, the relevant question with respect to corruption along ethnic lines becomes 
what constitutes their collective endeavour – upholding corrupt relationships or preventing 
them? It was argued that the answer to this question should depend on the type of corrupt 
transaction, and in particular on to what extent it could be perceived – rightly or not – to be 
mutually beneficial to both parties involved. If the corrupt relationship contains an element of 
collusion, the enforcement mechanisms within ethnic communities could arguably act to 
strengthen the corrupt contract. However, if the corrupt transaction is more clearly extortive, 
this enforcement mechanism could reasonably work in the opposite direction, i.e. to enable 
anti-bribery agreements and uphold a non-corrupt relationship.  
Empirical findings drawing on data for more than 23,000 respondents in 17 African 
countries indeed suggest that individual corruption experiences vary systematically along 
ethnic lines. The baseline estimations, focusing on experiences with corruption when applying 
for documents and permits, suggested that belonging to influential ethnic groups is associated 
with a greater probability of having experienced corruption. Provided that belonging to a 
larger and economically/politically stronger group helps proxy for a greater probability of the 
corrupt public official being a co-ethnic, this should imply more corruption among co-ethnics, 
supporting the idea that enforcement mechanisms within ethnic groups could act to strengthen 
corrupt contracts.  
Importantly, though, the results depend on the type of corruption considered. In line with 
the idea that whether co-ethnics uphold or prevent corrupt relationships depends on to what 
extent the corrupt transaction could be perceived as mutually beneficial to both parties 
involved, using an alternative corruption measure capturing corruption that is more clearly 
extortive, there is less evidence of more corruption among co-ethnics. However, whereas the 
extent to which co-ethnics uphold corrupt relationships seems to vary with the type of corrupt 
transaction considered, the empirical estimations never suggest a negative relationship 
between ‘influential group’ affiliation and corruption experience. Hence, the empirical 
findings provide no evidence for co-ethnics acting to prevent corrupt transactions.  
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In order to be able to effectively tackle corruption we need to understand along which 
dimensions it varies. In general terms, the empirical findings of this paper highlight the 
relevance of not only considering systemic differences in corruption levels, but also taking 
account of within-country variation in individual experiences with corruption. More 
specifically, they suggest systematic variation in corruption experiences based on ethnic 
affiliations, and that for corruption containing an element of collusion the ties among co-
ethnics could act to uphold corrupt relationships. These relationships could be investigated 
further with detailed data on ethnic affiliations of both the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker. In 
the meantime, the results point to the importance of impartiality in the state apparatus, and to 
the danger of appointing public officials based on ethnic affiliations. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Individual corruption experiences: ‘Largest group’ effect (probit marginal effects)   
 
Dependent variable is Corruption experience (dummy)     
Largest group 0.028** 0.024* 0.025** 0.025** 0.026** 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Rural  -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.031*** 
Individual controls 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Female  -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age  0.005*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary  0.026** 0.032** 0.032** 0.033*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Secondary  0.059*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Post-secondary  0.145*** 0.169*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Part-time   0.028** 0.028** 0.029** 
   (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Full-time   0.010 0.010 0.012 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Poverty index   0.035*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Christian    -0.000 -0.004 
    (0.015) (0.014) 
Muslim    0.007 0.015 
    (0.022) (0.019) 
Share educated     -0.034 
Regional controls 
     (0.053) 
Av. poverty score     0.052*** 
     (0.019) 
Share employed     -0.040 
     (0.059) 
Share rural     -0.063** 
     (0.030) 
Share Christian     0.066 
     (0.083) 
Share Muslim     0.020 
     (0.076) 
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes  
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The 
within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to gender, region, 
urban-rural distribution etc. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size 
(N=1200).  
Observations 17300 17300 17300 17300 17300  
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Table 2: Individual corruption experiences: Using alternative ethnic group variables   
 
Dependent variable is Corruption experience (dummy).  Presenting probit marginal effects   
 
Panel A: Group share effect      
Group share 0.069** 0.054* 0.060** 0.060** 0.060** 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) 
Rural, female, age, education yes yes yes yes 
Individual controls 
Employment, poverty  yes yes yes 
Religion    yes yes 
Regional controls
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes  
     yes 
 
Observations 17300 17300 17300 17300 17300  
Better ec. group 0.018* 0.015 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
Panel B: Belonging to economically better off group     
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Rural, female, age, education yes yes yes yes 
Individual controls 
Employment, poverty  yes yes yes 
Religion    yes yes 
Regional controls
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes  
     yes 
 
Observations 16335 16335 16335 16335 16335  
More pol. influence 0.020** 0.017* 0.019* 0.019* 0.018* 
Panel C: Belonging to group with more political influence    
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Rural, female, age, education yes yes yes yes 
Individual controls 
Employment, poverty  yes yes yes 
Religion    yes yes 
Regional controls
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes  
     yes 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The 
within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to gender, region, 
urban-rural distribution etc. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size 
(N=1200).  
Observations 16040 16040 16040 16040 16040  
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Table 3: Using alternative corruption measure (probit marginal effects)    
Dependent variable is Alternative (water and sanitation) corruption measure (dummy)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Rural, female, age, educ  yes yes yes yes 
Employment, Ec. standing   yes yes yes 
Religion    yes yes 
Regional controls     yes 
Country dummies yes yes  yes yes yes  
Panel A: ‘Largest group’ effect        
Largest group 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Observations 16604 16604 16604 16604 16604 
Panel B: ‘Group share’ effect        
Group share 0.013 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Observations 16604 16604 16604 16604 16604 
Panel C: ‘Better ec. group’ effect        
Better ec. group 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 15687 15687 15687 15687 15687 
Panel D: ‘More pol. influence’ effect       
More pol. influence 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.012* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 15386 15386 15386 15386 15386  
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The 
within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to gender, region, 
urban-rural distribution etc. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size 
(N=1200).  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
   Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Corruption experience 17300 0.202 0.401 0 1 
Alternative corruption measure 16604 0.117 0.322 0 1 
Ethnic group variables 
   Largest group 17300 0.374 0.484 0 1 
Group share 17300 0.235 0.240 0.0002 0.819 
Better ec. group 16335 0.216 0.412 0 1 
More pol. influence 16040 0.230 0.421 0 1 
Individual control variables 
Rural 17300 0.610 0.488 0 1 
Female 17300 0.488 0.500 0 1 
Age 17300 35.533 13.980 18 99 
Age squared 17300 1458.048 1219.060 324 9801 
Primary 17300 0.352 0.478 0 1 
Secondary 17300 0.389 0.487 0 1 
Post-secondary 17300 0.120 0.325 0 1 
Part-time 17300 0.156 0.363 0 1 
Full-time 17300 0.187 0.390 0 1 
Poverty index 17300 -0.009 0.999 -1.991 3.829 
Christian 17300 0.693 0.461 0 1 
Muslim 17300 0.221 0.415 0 1 
Regional control variables 
Share educated 17300 0.494 0.234 0.036 1 
Av. poverty score 17300 -0.005 0.318 -0.984 1.299 
Share employed 17300 0.337 0.171 0.025 0.950 
Share rural 17300 0.615 0.291 0 1 
Share Christian 17300 0.691 0.305 0 1 
Share Muslim 17300 0.223 0.327 0 1 
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Table A2: Variable descriptions    
Dependent variables 
Corruption experience: Dummy variable equal to one if, during the past year, the respondent has ‘had to pay a 
bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to get a document or permit’ (those with 
no experience of the activity during the period are left out of the estimation); zero otherwise. 
Alternative corruption measure: Dummy variable equal to one if, during the past year, the respondent has ‘had to 
pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to get water or sanitation services’ 
(those with no experience of the activity during the period are left out of the estimation); zero otherwise. 
Ethnic group variables 
Largest group: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent belongs to the largest language group in the 
country sample; zero otherwise. Based on the question ‘Which [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] language is your 
home language? That is, the language of your group of origin’.  
Group share: The share of the survey respondents in the country speaking the respondent’s language. Based on 
the question ‘Which [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] language is your home language? That is, the language of 
your group of origin’. 
Better ec. group: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports to belong to an ethnic group with better 
economic conditions than other ethnic groups in the country; zero otherwise. 
More pol. influence: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports to belong to an ethnic group with 
more political influence than other ethnic groups in the country; zero otherwise. 
Individual control variables 
Female: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is female; zero otherwise. 
Rural: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in a rural area; zero otherwise. 
Age variables: Age in years and age squared. 
Education (based on question about what is the respondent’s highest level of education):  
Primary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s highest level of education is at primary school 
level (including those with incomplete primary); zero otherwise. Secondary: Dummy variable equal to 
one if the respondent’s highest level of education is at secondary school level (including those with 
incomplete secondary); zero otherwise. Post-secondary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s 
highest level of education is at post-secondary school level (including those with incomplete post-
secondary); zero otherwise. Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has no formal schooling used 
as reference category in estimations. 
Employment: Full-time: dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has full-time paid employment; zero 
otherwise. Part-time: dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has part-time paid employment, zero 
otherwise. Dummy for having no employment used as reference category in estimations.  
Poverty index: A poverty index with mean zero and standard deviation one within each country, higher values 
imply that the respondent is poorer. Constructed as the first principal component of the answers to, 'Over 
the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: (a) enough food to eat, 
(b) enough clean water for home use, (c) medicines or medical treatment, (d) enough fuel to cook your 
food?’, with response categories ranging from 0 for ’never’ to 4 for ’always’ for each item. 
Religion (based on question ‘What is your religion, if any?’): Christian: Dummy variable equal to one if the 
respondent reports to be Christian; zero otherwise, Muslim: Dummy variable equal to one if the 
respondent reports to be Muslim; zero otherwise. Having another religious affiliation or not being 
religious is used as reference category in estimations. 
Regional control variables: Sub-national regional (first-order administrative division in each country) averages. 
Share educated: Share in region who have some secondary school or more education. 
Av. poverty score: Average poverty index score in region. 
Share employed: Share in region who have paid employment (full-time or part-time). 
Share rural: Share in region who live in rural areas.   
Share Christian: Share in region who are Christian. 
Share Muslim: Share in region who are Muslim. 
Country dummies: Dummies for the 17 countries in the sample.   
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Table A3: Tendency to apply for documents and permits (probit marginal effects)   
Dependent variable is: Never applied for document or permit (dummy)    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Rural, female, age, educ yes yes yes yes 
Employment, Ec. standing  yes yes yes 
Religion    yes yes 
Regional controls     yes 
Country dummies yes yes  yes yes yes  
Panel A: ‘Largest group’ effect      
Largest group -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Observations 23312 22982 22677 22542 22542 
Panel B: ‘Group share’ effect      
Group share 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.011 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) 
Observations 23312 22982 22677 22542 22542 
Panel C: ‘Better ec. group’ effect      
Better ec. group -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Observations 22262 21971 21705 21581 21581 
Panel D: ‘More pol. influence’ effect     
More pol. influence -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 21788 21512 21262 21141 21141  
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The 
within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to gender, region, 
urban-rural distribution etc. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size 
(N=1200).  
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Table A4: Individual corruption experiences in different sub-samples: ‘Largest group’ effect (probit marginal effects)  
Panel A: Dependent variable is Corruption experience (dummy)  
 (Sample 1) (Sample 2) (Sample 3) (Sample 4) (Sample 5) (Sample 6) (Sample 7) (Sample 8)  
Largest group 0.028** 0.033** 0.044*** 0.030** 0.026** 0.043*** 0.030** 0.022* 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
All individual controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
All regional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Observations 11177 13013 10943 12470 12274 11442 13433 11141  
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is Alternative (water and sanitation) corruption measure (dummy)  
 (Sample 1) (Sample 2) (Sample 3) (Sample 4) (Sample 5) (Sample 6) (Sample 7) (Sample 8)  
Largest group 0.006 0.005 0.016** -0.000 0.003 0.010 0.001 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
All individual controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
All regional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Observations 10677 12577 10408 12044 11750 11010 13010 10670  
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are weighted using combined 
within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to gender, region, urban-rural distribution 
etc. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size (N=1200).  
Sample 1 excludes the five countries whose largest ethnic group is comparatively small (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Liberia, South Africa);  
Sample 2 excludes the five countries whose largest ethnic group is comparatively large (Zimbabwe, Botswana, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Namibia);  
Sample 3 excludes the five countries with the highest number of ethnic groups (Ghana, Uganda, Zambia, Nigeria, Tanzania);  
Sample 4 excludes the five countries with the lowest number of ethnic groups (Zimbabwe, Botswana, Senegal, South Africa, Benin); 
Sample 5 excludes the five countries where the smallest share of respondents identifies in ethnic terms (Tanzania, Liberia, Ghana, South Africa, Kenya); 
Sample 6 excludes the five countries where the largest share of respondents identifies in ethnic terms (Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, Uganda, Nigeria); 
Sample 7 excludes the five countries with the smallest ethnic trust gap (Namibia, Botswana, Senegal, Benin, Tanzania);  
Sample 8 excludes the five countries with the largest ethnic trust gap (Mali, Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa); 
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Figure A1: Country shares with document/permit corruption experience in the past year (dummy = 1)  
 
Figure A2: Country shares with water/sanitation corruption experience in the past year (dummy = 1)  
 
 
 
Figure A3: Share of largest ethnic group, by country  
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Figure A4: Number of ethnic groups1 by country  
1Based on the question ‘Which [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] language is your home language? That is, the language 
of your group of origin’ 
 
 
Figure A5: Share with strong ethnic identities1 by country  
 
1Those who report to identify more with their ethnic group than with their country 
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Figure A6: Ethnic trust gap1 (trust in members of own group – trust in members of other groups), by country  
 
1Based on the question ‘How much do you trust each of the following types of people: a) People from your 
own ethnic group? b) People from other ethnic groups?’ (response categories: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 
2=Somewhat, 3=A lot) from the Afrobarometer round 3. The trust gap is defined as the average trust in 
people from own group – the average trust in people from other groups. The question was not asked in 
Zimbabwe, and Burkina Faso and Liberia are not included in the Afrobarometer round 3.  
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